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ABSTRACT

The central concepts from two rhetorical systems (the enthymeme in Aristotle's rhetoric and vivacity in George Campbell's) may be understood as the connection between speech act and ascension to belief. A review of the literature indicates a gap in the scholarly works seeking to compare and contrast the periods developed by D. Ehninger's systems approach to rhetoric and the method used to discern the periods. George Campbell's writings reflect the period of the Enlightenment in which he lived. Campbell's objective is to understand how the mind is able to receive external stimuli. The key element of communication is vivacity (a feeling created by language use, pathetic circumstances, and sympathy that agitates the passions). Vivacity works as a vehicle to belief when it strengthens reason with passions that brings hearers' minds closer to the thoughts of the speaker. The elements of enthymemes are shaped into modes of proof--ethos, pathos, and logos. The parallel elements of the enthymeme and vivacity are: the notion of probability; Aristotle's maxims and Campbell's auxiliary passions; Campbell's language use and Aristotle's logos; and Aristotle's ethos and Campbell's sympathy. Aristotle and Campbell suggest different paths by which reason leads to knowledge. Rhetorical ends for Aristotle are probable truths and for Campbell moral evidence. The enthymeme and vivacity, though different in structure, use similar elements of emotional appeals and credibility of the speaker to reach the mind of the hearer, utilizing reason and emotion to create belief. (Sixty-two notes are included.) (RS)

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Vehicles to Belief: Aristotle's Enthymeme and George Campbell's Vivacity Compared

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Paper presented at the Central States Communication Association's annual meeting

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Douglas Ehninger's "On Systems of Rhetoric," responds to the classical archetype of rhetoric with a systems approach for categorizing and studying rhetorics. Ehninger argues that there has been too much domination of "the notion of the classical rhetoric as a preferred archetype from which all departures are greater or lesser aberrations."[1] In response to the classical archetype, he organizes major rhetorical treatises into systems, which he defines as an "organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about something."[2] He does not restrict a system's content to that of only one work, stating, "the rhetoric embodied collectively in the treatises of a given place or period also constitutes a system. . . ."[3] Ehninger refers to his systems approach as being "macroscopic" in nature, suggesting that

> a macroscopic view extending over an entire genus of treatises submerges differences and details so as to call forth the common characteristics of rhetorical systems as organized wholes--the parts of which they are composed, the joints at which they are articulated, and the weaknesses to which they are prone."[4]

Overall, Ehninger's systems model has been praised as providing "a framework in which we can concentrate almost exclusively on the major Western theorists without sacrificing what is significant and unique in the body of rhetorical literature."[5] So notable is the acceptance of his systems approach that it has provided definition and a point of reference from which scholars initiate their studies. For example, Fisher and Brockriede apply Ehninger's systems approach to justify their comparison and contrast of Kenneth Burke to Plato, Aristotle, and George Campbell.

One weakness, however, of any categorizing method of study is its breadth of scope, ignoring individual qualities of rhetorics. Questions about macroscopic methods used to study rhetoric were advanced in a 1980

symposium.[6] Ray E. McKerrow, Eric W. Skopec, Floyd D. Anderson, and Michael C. Leff each presented what they considered to be "preferred" method of historical study of rhetorical theory. Despite their advocating dissimilar approaches, they all agree that there is a schism between microscopic inquiries that study a limited number of documents and macroscopic inquiries that seek to answer research questions by using broad categories.

Following this notion that microscopic inquiry differs from macroscopic inquiry in its conclusions, this essay conducts a microscopic inquiry into theoretical components in two rhetorics which are categorized into different systems by Ehninger. This microscopic analysis examines his premise that the classical period is deficient in its attention to the mind of the hearer; as Ehninger claims, "classical writers tended either to scant or to present a patently naive account of the relation between the speech act and the mind of the hearer."[7] The relationship between speech act and mind of the audience is in the art of creating belief. "Belief lies at the base of all attempts at communication."[8] The goal of the speaker, then, is to affect or possibly change the auditors' belief.

Accepting the systems identified by Ehninger, this essay attempts to find out how the notion of belief may transcend the two systems--grammatical and psychological. In order to advance this position, I look at central concepts from each system: the enthymeme in Aristotle's rhetoric and vivacity in George Campbell's. Upon further study, hopefully, these central concepts may be understood as the connection between speech act and Ascension to belief.

The scholarly literature, which has been devoted to Aristotle and Campbell and their theoretical components of the enthymeme, and vivacity

respectively, is vast and numerous. Thus, it will be divided into two sections: first, articles that pertain to the interpretation or function of the terms; and second, articles that relate, explicitly, the two rhetoricians.

The secondary sources that address Aristotle's enthymeme range from articles concerning the difficulty in understanding Aristotle's definition of the enthymeme,[9] to ones that claim "the enthymeme is central to Aristotle's concept of rhetoric."[10] From yet another perspective, Charles S. Mudd suggests that contemporary understanding of the enthymeme "deviates from Aristotle's conception of it."[11] This position echoes James McBurney's "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory." McBurney further finds the enthymeme to be slighted in our study of argument and conjectures that its function is "seriously misunderstood."[12] Lloyd Bitzer's seminal article, "The Enthymeme Revisited," confronts the definitions of the enthymeme posited by McBurney, Lane Cooper, Charles Sears Baldwin, Thomas De Quincey, and E. M. Cope.[13]

The majority of the studies that look at Campbell's writings have revolved around persons by whom he was influenced, including Francis Bacon,[14] Thomas Reid,[15] and David Hume.[16] Other studies have investigated Campbell's influence on other rhetoricians such as Hugh Blair, Joseph Priestley, and Richard Whately.[17] But, the articles of interest to this study are ones that address the notion of vivacity. The assumed origin of vivacity in Campbell's writings has been from Hume's "lively idea." Bitzer explicates Campbell's application of Hume's theory of human nature to discern how vivacity fits into Campbell's theory of rhetoric:

> The Hume-Campbell theory of human nature, in which the quality of vivacity is central, determines the fundamental character of

> Campbell's theory of rhetoric which stresses belief generated by the communication of "lively and glowing ideas."[18]

Bevilacqua, on the other hand, argues that "Campbell's vivacity rests also on principles in the tradition of Longinus that by the mid-eighteenth century were commonplace in English aesthetic theory."[19]

The following area of scholarship is concerned with comparisons drawn between Aristotle and Campbell. Not included are the various histories of rhetoric, such as those that are the object of Ehninger's attack on the classical rhetoric archetype.

The relationship between Aristotle and Campbell is usually reported as Campbell breaking from Aristotelian theory due to his dropping of the topoi and his disdain for syllogistic reasoning.[20] Also, Ehninger develops his distinction of the classical view as being subject-centered. He states, "implicit in the classical view is the assumption that the proper way to begin preparing an address is to analyze the subject. . . ."[21] This position, then, is the basis of his argument for Campbell revolutionizing rhetoric. Instead of being a subject-centered rhetoric, Ehninger suggests that Campbell's rhetorical effort is "to make the hearer rather than the speech itself the central factor in invention."[22] Dominic LaRusso responds to Ehninger by arguing that the classical rhetoric is audience-centered, and, therefore, sees a clear link between the two rhetoricians.[23] Bevilacqua lends support to the relationship of Campbell to the ancients, saying, "The Philosophy of Rhetoric reflects as much the science, the philosophy, and the aesthetics of the English Enlightenment as it does the rhetorical theory of Greece and Rome."[24] Bormann concurs with this position by stating "that the notion of vivid description was commonplace in aesthetic, poetic, and rhetoric theory by the time Campbell wrote.[25]

The review of literature indicates a gap in the scholarly works seeking to compare and contrast the periods developed by Ehninger and the method used to discern the periods. In particular, no study has sought to extract theoretical components from the theories of major figures of these periods and evaluate them microscopically. Because they are the pillars of rhetorical theory during their time, Aristotle and Campbell are prime sources for such a study. As shown above, the two rhetoricians have been compared to one another, yet mainly by illustrating their differences. The articles that expose similarities are sketchy and none offer any significant insights that would be useful to test Ehninger's systems approach. Finally, no scholarship considers the enthymeme or vivacity as being a "vehicle" to belief nor specifically compares them.

The study of belief has been confined, by and large, to the social scientific approach to persuasion and to philosophy as it leads to knowledge.[24] In rhetoric, belief assumes a position of unquestioned importance in moving people to action. The rhetorician attempts to discern how speakers use different appeals to an audience that may cause change in their beliefs, perhaps followed by action upon the new belief. For the purpose of the paper, then, belief will be viewed as the human element that must be affected by the speaker's appeals for moving people to the prescribed action.

Scholarly writings on the enthymeme and vivacity do not indicate, explicitly, their role as being a vehicle to belief; rather, there is an implication of their importance in the creation of belief, which is indicated by their central position within the respective theories. Miller and Bee, in their article, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," explain that to Aristotle, "the Enthymeme holds a position of unquestioned prominence, it

is the 'substance of the rhetorical persuasion,' the very 'body of proof,' and 'the orator's proper modes of persuasion.'"[27] McBurney also asserts, "For Aristotle, the enthymeme was the focal concept of all reasoned discourse. He speaks of it as "the very body and substance of persuasion."[28] Bitzer suggests that vivacity, a Humeian term adopted by Campbell, is "an idea of compelling power, the quality chiefly responsible for assent. Vivacity . . . then is the quality in perceptions which largely determines our degree of belief."[29] Ehninger also promotes this position of vivacity when he states that Campbell "makes Hume's 'lively' or 'vivacious' idea the chief effector of persuasion."[30]

The Nature and Function of Vivacity as a Vehicle to Belief

George Campbell's writings reflect the period of the Enlightenment in which he lived. The Enlightenment questioned long held assumptions about knowledge and human understanding of nature. The syllogism, which has been the method used to obtain knowledge, fell into disrepute. Francis Bacon was the catalyst behind the denunciation of the syllogism as a means to new knowledge.[31] In its place, he developed a method of investigation that was viewed as a more reliable way to knowledge, empirical induction. Campbell embraced this new method of inquiry and incorporated it in his The Philosophy of Rhetoric. He also relied on the "Common Sense" philosophy of Thomas Reid.[32] By applying these studies of the mind's faculties to rhetoric, Campbell's objective is to understand how the mind is able to receive external stimuli and his application to rhetoric assumes another's mind and expression of thought through speech as external stimuli. Therefore, Campbell attempts to discern qualities of communication needed to transfer thoughts to the minds of others. The key element of communication in conveying thoughts is vivacity or the "lively idea."

Originally in David Hume's theory of human nature, vivacity is brought into the realm of rhetoric by Campbell.

Vivacity is a feeling created by language use, pathetic circumstances, and sympathy that agitates the passions. As a feeling, its definition is problematic. Qualities of vivacity, though, are posited by Campbell as, "force," "liveliness," "energy," "brightness," "brilliancy," "steadiness," and "lustre." Its effect is to represent an object or thought in a manner that triggers the release of similar feelings locked in the memory as experience. Thus, ideas must be sensed by the audience to combine sensation and experience.

This connection is explained best by Campbell's notion of experience. Experience is the retention of ideas and the association that results when the mind understands similarities within different circumstances. Vivacity gains its effect by being a "lively idea" of a circumstance. That is, it is sensed in imagination through illuminating its similarities with circumstances held in memory as experience. The effect of this connection, then, is an arousal of the passions, which provokes attention and instills belief.

Campbell defines rhetoric as "the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes."[33] Also, he identifies four different ends to discourse--to inform the understanding, the please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.[34] The end focused upon in this study blends passions and reason. Campbell's term for this combination is "vehemences of contention, which is admirably fitted for persuasion, and hath always been regarded as the supreme qualification in an orator."[35]

Vivacity enlivens a reasoned idea so that the hearers will respond and act in proper fashion. Vivid expression, produced by a synthesis of the elements of vivacity, is perceived by sensation. The senses, when charged with vivacity, excite passions. This, then, is the path lively ideas take to the experiences held in memory.

Therefore, vivacity works as a vehicle to belief when it strengthens reason with passions that brings hearers' minds closer to the thoughts of the speaker. This union of thoughts and feelings causes hearers' minds to become susceptible toward changing their previous beliefs about the subject to those of the speaker's.

The Nature and Function of the Enthymeme as a Vehicle to belief

The elements of enthymemes are shaped into the modes of proof--ethos, pathos, and logos. Ethos is the perceived character of the speaker as it is persuasive in causing the audience to trust and believe what the speaker is advocating. Pathos accounts for the emotions and how the speaker is able to affect them so as to put the audience into "a certain frame of mind."[34] Logos provides the words appropriate to prove the subject. The role of the enthymeme, then, in creating belief or changing how the audience considers the subject is to demonstrate probable knowledge about a course of action and to excite the audience to act accordingly. Hence, the enthymeme is a synthesis of logic and emotion. For an audience to be moved toward a solution of a problem presented by a speaker, there must be a reliance on common knowledge and that knowledge must be driven by emotions, because they are "all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgment."[34] The cooperation between the speaker and audience that is needed to construct an enthymeme, alone, creates an emotional bond because the speaker's arguments are based on the audience's opinion and knowledge.

Hence, the enthymeme is Aristotle's vehicle for combining the lines of argument for both logic and emotion, which are needed to establish belief and lead people to make judgments based on probable knowledge.

Belief is not a term embraced by the ancients like is was for the Enlightenment writers. In order to gain an insight on how belief could have been conceived by Aristotle, a discussion of the Greek term pistis may be instructive. The translation of "pistis" to English is "proof." William Grimaldi, a noted Aristotelian scholar, explains pistis. Ethos, pathos, and logos, together, are "subject-matter capable of inducing in an audience a state of mind called 'pistis,' or belief."[37] He also argues that the enthymeme is the method to utilize this material.[38] Evidence of the relationship of pistis to belief is in the Rhetoric. Aristotle states that "things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in."[39] This sentence not only exhibits Aristotle's use of "proof" and "belief," but also works as a springboard to perhaps the strongest argument concerning the relationship between the enthymeme and vivacity in creating belief--their role in uniting reason and the passions. Having thus described the nature and function of both the enthymeme and vivacity, I turn to the relationship between the enthymeme and vivacity based upon their function as being the 'vehicle' to belief?"

The relationship between the enthymeme and vivacity as vehicles to belief will be identified by examining both their parallels and differences as they operate to create belief. Further, I will discuss the distinction between reason and rhetoric as pathways to knowledge in Aristotle and Campbell as that distinction illuminates the process of creation of belief in the audience. Finally, I will suggest that vivacity and the enthymeme

play a similar and key roll--that of creating belief--in the rhetorical systems set out by Campbell and Aristotle.

The Comparison of Elements in the Enthymeme and Vivacity

Although the elements of the enthymeme and vivacity are different, there seem to be parallels. The parallels are: the notion of probability; Aristotle's maxims and Campbell's auxiliary passions; Campbell's language use and Aristotle's logos; and Aristotle's ethos and Campbell's sympathy.

The notion of probability is in both rhetorics. Probabilities make up the major premises of enthymemes while probability, for Campbell, is a circumstance that operates on the passions. Both account for uncertainties that are based on prior evidence. Hence, when a probability is offered by a speaker, the evidence to support it must exist in the minds of the hearers for them to think that it could happen. Also, in regard to probability, both rhetorics advance the position that conclusions drawn from speeches are probable. Aristotle comes to this because of a logical consistency; premises of speeches are probable, so must their conclusions be probable.[40] Campbell states that "in moral reasoning we ascend from possibility by an insensible gradation, to probability, and then, in the same manner, to the summit of moral certainty."[41] Both Aristotle and Campbell apply probabilities to rhetoric as it accounts for the "humanness" of decision making as there are no absolutes in human conduct. Aristotle's "contingent" in his recognition of the variableness of human action, while in Campbell, moral evidence, which is the "proper province of rhetoric," accounts for the principles of human "consciousness and common sense."[42]

Aristotle's maxims and Campbell's auxiliary passions also seem similar as they both pertain to codes of conduct for people to follow.[43] These codes are assumed knowledge. Aristotle states that maxims are "only about questions or practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided."[44] Courses of conduct to be chosen seem to be what Campbell defines as auxiliary passions, such as a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, and a sense of glory.[45] Therefore, both maxims and auxiliary passions account for the unwritten rules of culture that people follow to support the culture and exist together.

The emphasis placed on language use by Campbell might be similar to logos, as both are concerned with words as they lead to belief, yet Campbell is more thorough than Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle accounts for the use of words as logos by stating that a mode of persuasion rendered by the spoken word depends on "the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself."[45] Yet, this language use is tied closely to logical argumentation. As he states of logos, "persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question."[46] For Campbell, language use creates vivacity through word choice, number of words, and arrangement of words. This language use accounts for persuasion yet, contrary to Aristotle, is concerned with style rather than argument.[47]

Ethos and sympathy are similar in that both address the character of the speaker and how it affects the perceptions of the hearers. Also in both, there seems to be an assumption that speakers must represent a strong moral character and be knowledgeable on the subject they address. In addition to these parallels, obvious differences can be identified in

Campbell's discussion of vivacity and Aristotle's discussion of the enthymeme.

The differences between the elements of vivacity and the enthymeme are that the pathetic circumstances of Campbell are not considered by Aristotle; Aristotle's lines of argument for ethos and pathos differ from Campbell's sympathy and circumstances; and Aristotle's application of sound argument through logic does not conform to Campbell's perspicuity and clarity of language.

Except for probability, the other pathetic circumstances seem not to be related to any of the elements of the enthymeme. The only possible connection is that they account for why emotions are created by circumstance. Aristotle accounts for emotions in a situational manner, as in how anger is caused and calmed, but there is little emphasis on the situation compared to the emotion.

The relationship between the enthymeme and vivacity as vehicles to belief seems to be founded on their blending of the emotions with reason. The difference, which separates the two, is that Aristotle presents lines of arguments that account for ethos and pathos, while Campbell accounts for these concepts through feelings of sympathy and circumstances that operate on the passions. Reason, in Aristotle's rhetoric, is developed through the soundness of argument as it applies the twenty-eight lines of argument. Reason, in Campbell's rhetoric, depends upon the perspicuity or clarity of language. When reason and emotion are combined, however, belief is most likely to be created because hearers will be involved in the subject through emotions and the credibility of the speaker.

Therefore, one clear distinction may be made between vivacity and the enthymeme. Because Aristotle's rhetoric is logical in nature, as its

emphasis is on lines of argument for reason and emotion, and Campbell's is stylistic in nature, as language use is emphasized for the development of reason and passion. The enthymeme logically is based in its form being a syllogism; and vivacity's form is more stylistic as it is constructed from word choice, number of words, and arrangement of words. In the next section, I will discuss the two theorists' notions of reason as it relates to rhetoric.

Much can be made of the different paths by which Aristotle and Campbell suggest that reason leads to knowledge. For Aristotle, new knowledge comes from existing knowledge. This section's purpose is to explain the accepted difference between Aristotle's deductive process and Campbell's inductive process. Also considered are their respective rhetorical ends, which for Aristotle are probable truths and for Campbell moral evidence.

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle states, "All teaching and all intellectual learning come about from already existing knowledge."[88] This includes the mathematical sciences, the arts, and arguments--both deductive and inductive, as "both produce their teaching through what we are already aware of, the former getting their premises as from men who grasp them, the latter proving the universal through the particular's being clear."[89] Reasoning and classification, according to Aristotle, are based on forms, which are notions of sensation and thought. These forms, a Platonic concept Aristotle refers to as "Ideas," provide the premises or existing knowledge upon which reason is based. In the Topics, Aristotle explains:

> For according to those who posit the existence of Ideas, those Ideas are at rest and are objects of thought . . . also they are objects of sensation, if they exist in us; for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize the form present in each individual.[90]

The forms, as universals or premises of syllogisms, allow for the relationship and identity necessary for syllogistic reason. Aristotle states, "[I]f there is no universal, there will be no middle term, and so no demonstration either."[51]

Campbell, on the other hand, says new knowledge comes from observation and experience, which involves inductive reasoning. Rather than depend upon existing knowledge, which is passed down through others who know the forms, Campbell thought learning to originate in experience. He states,

> We learn from experience, that the mistakes or oversights committed by the mind in one operation, are sometimes, on a review, corrected on the second, or perhaps on a third. Besides, the repetition, when no error is discovered, enlivens the remembrance, and so strengthens the conviction. But, for this conviction, it is plain that we are in a great measure indebted to memory, and in some measure even to experience.[52]

Reasoning from existing knowledge and reasoning from experience are, respectively, the classic distinctions between deductive and inductive logic. This is, as well, a distinction frequently drawn between classical and post-Baconian logic. However, to make this the sole distinction between the rhetorical syllogism of Aristotle and Campbell is to fall prey to simplistic thinking.

Aristotle acknowledges inductive reasoning. For example, he discusses induction in situations when the conclusion of a syllogism is not made familiar through the middle term.[53] Aristotle says of induction, "For in some cases learning occurs in this way, and the last term [conclusion] does not become familiar through the middle [term]--in cases dealing with what are in fact particulars and not said of any underlying subject."[54]

Campbell, on the other hand, applies deductive reasoning through the "Common Sense" philosophy developed by Thomas Reid. Campbell asserts

common sense to be "an original source of knowledge common to all mankind."[55] Examples of this knowledge are "Whatever has a beginning has a cause;" "The course of nature will be the same tomorrow that it is today; or "The future will reseemble the past;" and "The clear representations of my memory, in regard to past events, are indubitably true."[56] This common knowledge, then, may be considered as universal truth and can be placed in a syllogism as the major premise. Further, Campbell devotes a section in his Rhetoric to deductive evidence, which incorporates common sense.

Campbell divides deductive evidence into demonstration and moral. Demonstration is derived from "the invariable properties or relations of general ideas." Campbell argues against this type of demonstration as being axiomatic. Therefore, this type of demonstration is formal and similar to the demonstrative syllogism Aristotle applies to metaphysics. But the rhetorical demonstration, which Aristotle applies to rhetoric, is informal as it is usually not based on universals, but rather probabilities with a contingent character. What becomes of interest to this study is the similarity between Aristotle's rhetorical demonstration and Campbell's moral evidence, which is "from the actual, though perhaps variable connections subsisting among things."[57] Specifically, moral evidence is comprised of principles based on consciousness and common sense, "improved by experience; and as it proceeds on this general presumption of moral axiom, that the course of nature in time to come will be similar to what it hath been hitherto, it decides, in regard to particulars, concerning the future from the past, and concerning things unknown from things familiar to us."[58] Therefore, the type of reasoning, which both Aristotle and Campbell apply to rhetoric, seems to be similar as both are based on and arrive at truth of a variable nature. Although Aristotle focuses on deductive reason

and Campbell on inductive, they are fully cognizant of the other form and seem to be aligned in regard to the type of reason applicable to rhetoric. Whereas a similar type of reasoning seems to exist in both theorists' rhetorics, the difference between Aristotle's logic being deductive and Campbell's being inductive provides the foundation for Aristotle's use of the enthymeme and Campbell's use of vivacity as their respective vehicles to belief.

Aristotle's enthymeme is in syllogistic form as a logical instrument to gain understanding. As shown above, deduction is the method used to discern form. The different types of inquiry--demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric--all utilize the syllogism. The distinction made among them is based on their major premise's or proposition's content. The demonstrative proposition is the assumption of one of two contradictory statements;[39] the dialectical proposition chooses between two contradictory statements; and the rhetorical syllogism's proposition is of probable truths from probabilities, signs, and examples. These propositions come from human knowledge, from the Forms, which are commonplaces and maxims in the mind of the hearer.

Campbell's method of inquiry for rhetoric, referred to as "moral reasoning," relies on testimony, analogy, experience, and calculation of chances to arrive at moral truths. Of particular interest to this study is experience and the association of ideas. As images gained through experience are stored in memory, they are considered as "lively signatures of memory, which command an unlimited assent."[40] Therefore, the application to rhetoric is that the ideas presented by the orator must be vivacious to be associated with similar ones in the memory of the hearer.

Thus, as the enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism is the instrument used to reach the commonplaces and maxims held in the mind of the hearer, vivacity or the lively ideas is the instrument conducive to reaching the "lively signatures" in the memories of the audience. Hence, the function common to both the enthymeme and vivacity is to operate on the mind of the hearer. The probable truths, derived from popular opinion, in the major premise of the enthymeme must exist in the mind of the hearer just as the moral truths derived from experience, to be vivacious, must exist in the memory. Still the application of these vehicles, as they are adapted to rhetoric, that is, to bring an audience to new knowledge and belief, seems to elucidate other similarities.

Similarities of the Enthymeme and Vivacity as Vehicles to Belief

The notion of belief, itself, needs explanation. In Chapter I, the definition of the art of belief was posited as the relationship between speech act, and mind of the audience. Speakers endeavor to affect the hearer's belief to align it with the one they advocate. The effect is conversion of attitude, which may cause action to be taken in accordance with the new belief. This, then, is the objective of persuasive speakers.

But, what also needs to be understood about belief is the variety of meanings Aristotle and Campbell attach to the concept, including their use of the term to acknowledge the reality or existence of an object. For Aristotle, people have beliefs relative to how "substance" is perceived. If I believe that I am working at a desk, the desk is the substance.[41] Although Campbell uses "belief" in a similar manner to this study, he also applies it to perceptions of reality. He uses "belief" to signify understanding of an object or concept. Yet, this use of "belief" differs

from the one presented in Chapter I because it indicates an attitude a speaker brings to the rhetorical situation, not a change induced by the speech. Hence, uses of "belief" by Aristotle and Campbell in senses other than change of attitude brought by a speaker were not adopted for this study.

Clearly, Campbell thinks vivacity creates belief, as "lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief."[42] Therefore, to apply the notion of "belief" as it is applied in this study to Campbell is less troublesome than to apply it to Aristotle. For Aristotle, enthymemes blend logos, which is reason or the words appropriate to prove the subject, with ethos, the credibility of the speaker, and pathos, which accounts for emotions aroused in the audience by the speaker. This blend leads to an emotional bond between speaker and audience because the missing proposition is derived from opinions of the popular audience. When this bond occurs, the hearer mind is most susceptible to attitude change.

Campbell's vivacity, on the other hand, moves the audience to belief by combining a reasoned idea with passion. This is accomplished by energizing an idea with a synthesis of language use, pathetic circumstances, auxiliary passions, and sympathy for the speaker.

The enthymeme and vivacity, though different in structure, share the same role as the vehicle to belief in their respective rhetorics. Both incorporate reason and passion in an attempt to persuade an audience. Although Aristotle's and Campbell's primary method of reasoning may differ, their methods of reaching and stirring emotions seems similar. While Aristotle relies on the enthymeme's syllogistic form to access these accepted ideas and memories, Campbell relies on vivacity.

The distinction between these two theoretical components lies in how the mind is perceived to hold knowledge. For Aristotle, deduction is conducive to learning, as people come to know the forms through the syllogism. For Campbell, a lively idea must be the tool applied to reach ideas in memory and to hold them in attention. However, despite the distinction, their similarity of function is striking. These two components use similar elements of emotional appeals and credibility of the speaker to reach the mind of the hearer, uniting reason and emotion to create belief.

ENDNOTES

[1]Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (Summer 1968), 140.

[2]Ehninger, "Systems of Rhetoric," p. 131.

[3]Ehninger, "Systems of Rhetoric," p. 131.

[4]Ehninger, "Systems of Rhetoric," p. 132.

[5]James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 3rd ed. (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), p. 25.

[6]This symposium appears in The Pennsylvania Speech Communication Annual 38 (1982), 5-24.

[7]Ehninger, "Systems of Rhetoric," p. 132.

[8]Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Message Preparation: The Nature of Proof, (New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc, 1966), p. 15.

[9]See Thomas M. Conley, "The Enthymeme in Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 20 (May 1984) 168-188. See also Nancy Harper, "An Analytical Description of Aristotle's Enthymeme," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 24 (Winter 1973), 304-09.

[10]William M. Anthony Grimaldi, The Enthymeme in Aristotle (Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975). Other articles that support this notion are Miller and Bee, "Enthymemes" Body and Soul"; Richard L. Lanigan, "Enthymeme: The Rhetorical Species of Aristotle's Syllogism," Quarterly Journal of Speech 34 (Spring 1974), 207-222; and Daniel J. Goulding, "Aristotle's Concept of the Enthymeme," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2 (September 1965), 104-08.

[11]Charles S. Mudd, "The Enthymeme and Logical Validity," Quarterly Journal of Speech 45 (December 1959), 409.

[12]James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme," p. 50.

[13]Lloyd Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," Quarterly Journal of Speech 45 (December 1959), 399.

[14]Vincent M. Bevilacqua's, "Philosophical Origins of George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric,' Speech Monographs, 32 (March 1965), 2-4.

[15]Dennis Bormann, "Some 'Common Sense' about Campbell, Hume, and Reid: The Extrinsic Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71 (November 1985), 395-421.

[16]Bitzer, "Hume's Philosophy in George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," p. 150.

[17]See Douglas Ehninger, "Campbell, Blair, and Whately Revisited," and "Campbell, Blair, and Whately: Old Friends in a New Light," Southern Speech Journal, 19 (October 1955), 263-69; Dale G. Leathers, "Whately's Logically Derived Rhetoric: A stranger in its Time," Western Speech, 33 (Winter 1969), 48-58; Ray E. McKerrow, "Campbell and Whately on the Utility of Syllogistic Logic," Western Speech, (Winter 1976), 3-13; and James L. Golden and Edward P. J. Corbett, The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1968).

[18]Bitzer, "Hume's Philosophy in George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," p. 157.

[19]Bevilacqua, "Philosophical Origins of George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," p. 11.

[20]See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "John Locke and the New Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (December 1967), 330-33.

[21]Douglas Ehninger, "George Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory," Southern Speech Journal, 15 (May 1950), 273.

[22]Ehninger, "George Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory," p. 273.

[23]See LaRusso's "Root or Branch? A Re-examination of Campbell's 'Rhetoric,'" Western Speech, 32 (Spring 1968), 85-91.

[24]Vincent Bevilacqua, "Campbell, Vico, and the Rhetorical Science of Human Nature," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 18 (1985), 24.

[25]Dennis R. Bormann, "George Campbell's Cura Prima on Eloquence," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 75 (1988), 35-51.

[26]For studies on belief that are scientific in nature, see W. J. McGuire, "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships." In C. I. Hovland and M. J. Rosenberg eds., Attitude Organization and Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960) and R. S. Wyer, "The Quantitative Prediction of Belief and Opinion Change: A Further Test of a Subjective Probability Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16 (1970), pp. 550-571. For a discussion on belief in the field of philosophy, see H. H. Price's Belief, (London: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1969).

[27]Arthur B. Miller and John D. Bee, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 5 (Fall 1972), 201.

[28]James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, 3 (1936), 49-74.

[29]Lloyd Bitzer, "Hume's Philosophy in George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2 (Summer 1969), 150.

[30]Douglas Ehninger, "Campbell, Blair, Whately Revisited," Western Speech, 28 (Spring 1963), 178.

[31]Bacon presents this method of inquiry in his essay, "The Great Instauration."

[32]Reid's influence on Campbell is discussed by Lloyd Ritzer in his editor's intorduction of George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Reid's theory of common sense, though, was a response to Hume's thoery of human nature and it is more extreme than Campbell's.

[33]Campbell, p. 4.

[34]Campbell, p. 92. This is where Campbell accounts for enthymemes.

[35]Campbell, p. xix.

[36]Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1394ª 24-25.

[37]William M. Grimaldi, "A Note on the Pistis in Aristotle's Rhetoric 1354-1356," American Journal of Philology 78 (January, 1957), 184.

[38]Grimaldi, "A Note on Pistis," p. 184.

[39]Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355ª 37-38.

[40]Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1394ª 24-25.

[41]Campbell, p. 92.

[42]See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1357ª 30-35.

[43]Campbell, p. 44.

[44]Campbell, p. 43.

[45]Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356ª 4.

[46]Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356ª 18-19.

[47]See Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric, bk. II, ch. VI for a discussion of perspicuous language as it leads to understanding.

[48]Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 71ª 1.

[49]Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71ª 5-9.

[50]Aristotle, Topics, 113ª 27.

[51]The middle term is the item that is being placed into the category or genus presented in the major premise.

[52]Campbell, p. 60.

[53]Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 77ª 6.

[54]Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71ª 20.

[55]Campbell, p. 38-39.

[56]Campbell, p. 40.

[57]Campbell, p. 43.

[58]Campbell, p. 43. The knowledge gained through common sense and consciousness bears a resemblance to the infallible signs or complete proofs in Aristotle's Rhetoric. For this comparison see 1357ᵇ of Aristotle's Rhetoric. A connection between moral evidence and vivacity may be made as moral evidence is "improved by experience." For this improvement to occur, an event, which is similar to a common sense principle, must be vivacious for it to connect with a similar common sense notion held in memory.

[59]See Aristotle's Prior Analytics, bk. I, chs. IV-XII for his discussion on deduction.

[60]Campbell, p. 41.

[61]See Aristotle's Categories, bk. I, ch. V for his discussion on substance.

[62]Campbell, p. 73.